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Abstract 
 
One of the biggest challenges facing Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
regarding their EU membership is the effective implementation and compliance with EU 
environmental legislation. Implementing the environmental acquis will expose their 
domestic institutional and administrative structures and patterns of policy making to 
significant pressures for adjustment to the new regulatory regime. Diverse economic, 
political and ecological conditions impose considerable burdens on a homogenous 
application of EU environmental legislation. A number of authors argue that 
harmonization is at odds with ecologic, economic or democratic normative criteria. These 
views, implicitly or explicitly, maintain that the current EU system of legal monitoring 
and enforcement is rigid and, in effect, fails to produce optimum policy outcomes in 
terms of balancing imperatives emanating from sustainable development with costs of 
environmental protection. This paper analyses the experience of past enlargements, with 
emphasis on the southern enlargement (Greece 1981, Spain and Portugal 1986) with the 
aim of assessing the extent to which the current system of EU legal monitoring and 
enforcement allows such flexible deviations from a uniform application of environmental 
legislation according to specific national and sub-national conditions. In order to do so, I 
draw on data on all infringement cases opened by the European Commission against 
southern member states. What lessons can we learn from the application of EU 
environmental law in member states with equally weak domestic institutional and 
administrative capacities regarding effective harmonization in the EU?
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Introduction 
 
The recent EU enlargement included the accession of ten new member states 
characterised by wide divergences in their institutional and administrative traditions in 
environmental policies presents both opportunities and threats for EU environmental 
policies in their current shape. On the one hand, the full adoption of the environmental 
aquis communitaire represents a unique opportunity to modernize the domestic 
regulatory regimes of the CEECs and expand their economic orientation to western 
European markets through the upgrade of their product standards to EU requirements. On 
the other hand, the lack of long term tradition in pro-active environmental policies in the 
CEECs generates scepticism regarding their capacity to effectively internalise the 
existing environmental acquis into their domestic regulatory regimes. Implementing the 
acquis will not only be an expensive attempt due to requirements for investment in 
physical and administrative infrastructure.1 It will also expose pre-existing domestic 
institutional structures and patterns of policy making to significant pressures for 
adjustment in order to facilitate effective implementation and compliance with EU 
environmental laws. Like the southern EU member states during the 1980s, CEECs 
concentrate a number of unfavourable socio-political and administrative conditions that 
are likely to generate considerable problems in the process of legal internalisation of EU 
environmental laws in their domestic regulatory regimes. The legacies of the common 
Communist experience such as excessive centralism in planning, weak administrative 
capacities, feeble civic culture and low policy priorities on environmental protection are 
likely to impede effective integration of domestic environmental policy traditions into the 
EU regulatory regime (Baker and Jehlicka 1998; Waller 1998).2 Moreover, a number of 
recent developments associated with the abrupt transition to a market economy without 
well established regulatory mechanisms, including extremely widespread corruption, 
increases reservations regarding the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to facilitate effective compliance with EU rules. Despite intensive pre-
                                                 
1 Commission’s reports estimate the costs of environmental harmonization in the CEECs between € 100 
and 200 billion.  
2 For country studies see Miko, 2000; Zylicz and Holzinger, 2000; O'Toole and Hanf, K 1998; Fagin and 
Jehlicka, 1998; Podoba, 1998; Millard, 1998. 
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accession negotiations and the application by the European Commission, for the first 
time, of a strict interpretation of conditionality to ensure effective incorporation of the 
aquis communitaire in these member states, both the academic community and policy 
practitioners share the view that effective harmonization will only be possible in the long 
term (CEC 2000). Given these modest assessments, there is a general apprehension that 
the inclusion of ten new member states with low policy priorities in environmental 
protection will further increase the existing implementation deficit in the application of 
existing laws by the member states and lead to a lowering of EU environmental standards 
(Baker, 2000; Carius et. al. 2000; Homeyer, 2004).3  A number of scholars question the 
effectiveness of harmonization as the core method of enlargement calling for the 
introduction of novel regulatory approaches that allow flexible responses to specific 
national and/or sub-national conditions that render harmonization infeasible (Holzinger 
and Knoepfel, 1999; Carius et al. 1999 Holzinger, 1999; Homeyer et al. 2000).  
Are these allegedly endemic socio-political institutional and administrative 
deficiencies common in all the southern and central eastern member states likely to 
undermine effective implementation of EU environmental legislation, producing an ever 
growing compliance deficit that threatens the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU policy 
making? This paper seeks to approach eastern enlargement through the lenses of past 
experience of the southern enlargement. Southern member states provide a critical case 
for drawing lessons for the CEECs. The current debate on the institutional and 
administrative deficiencies of the CEECs in adjusting to the requirements for an effective 
integration to the EU environmental regulatory regime harks back to a similar discourse 
that goes on from the end of the 1980s regarding the effects of southern enlargement on 
EU environmental policy. The debate summarised under the label Mediterranean 
Syndrome (MS), or the Southern Problem (SP), departs from the assumption of a poor 
compliance record of southern member states with EU environmental legislation. 
Proponents of both the MS and SP approaches identify a number of endemic deficiencies 
inherent in the socio-political and administrative structures of southern member states 
                                                 
3 However, others challenge these views by arguing that after the fall of communist regimes most of the 
CEECs placed significant emphasis on pro-active environmental policies. These trends were halted by the 
top-down imperatives of environmental harmonization with EU laws (Jehlicka 2002; Jehlicka and Trickle 
2004; Schreurs 2004).  
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that are believed to account for their profound incapacity to adjust to the underlying logic 
and the specific requirements of EU environmental policies. Compared to their north 
European counterparts in the EU, the southern countries have a weak civil culture 
plagued by corruption and clientelism, which impedes the emergence of co-operative 
compliant behaviour. Fragmented administrative structures that lack essential 
organizational resources (funding, personnel and know-how) to engage in effective 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental policies and a party-dominated legislative 
process hinder the enactment of effective public good regulations (Aguilar Fernandez, 
1994; La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; Pridham, 1996; Pridham and Cini, 1994).  
Literature on environmental harmonization in the EU focuses on the identification 
of domestic institutional factors that facilitate or impede compliance with rules (Börzel, 
2003; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 1999). However, little attention has been 
drawn to the strategies of the European Commission in dealing with compliance 
problems in those member states. Moreover, there are only a limited amount of studies 
that seek to assess the effectiveness of current monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
at the EU level, especially regarding the Commission’s ability to respond to specific 
national and sub-national geographical, demographic, political, institutional and 
economic conditions that render effective harmonization unattainable. This paper seeks to 
address this problematique by elaborating on quantitative data that highlights the extent 
to which legal monitoring and enforcement at the EU level allows such flexible 
deviations from a uniform application of environmental legislation.  
The paper is divided in four sections. The following part draws on the main 
theoretical perspectives on member state compliance with EU laws. It elaborates on a set 
of hypotheses regarding the nature of the current monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, the corresponding strategies, and legal and political instruments at the 
disposal of the European Commission when dealing with national governments seeking 
to deviate from common environmental standards at the EU. Part three suggests a 
quantitative approach that allows an assessment of the current EU system of monitoring 
and legal enforcement. It analyses the temporal dimension of infringement proceedings in 
order to assess the degree of flexibility or rigidity of the application of the relevant Treaty 
provisions by the Commission against non-compliant member states. In light of 
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quantitative analysis, the final part revisits current debates calling for the introduction of 
novel, flexible instruments at the EU level.  
 
Flexibility or Rigidity? Assessing the nature of the EU system of legal 
enforcement   
 
Literature on member state (non)compliance with EU law focuses on two 
antithetical theoretical perspectives regarding the nature of interactions between national 
and supranational institutions in the course of national governments’ applying 
internationally agreed commitments. Rational choice approaches focus on cost-benefit 
considerations of national actors regarding their compliance with EU laws. Their 
fundamental assertion is that domestic actors’ compliance performance is contingent 
upon their perceptions regarding the adjustment costs involved in applying EU laws to 
their domestic legal, political and administrative systems. Implementation of EU policies 
(application and enforcement) depends on domestic institutional and administrative 
structures. EU institutions are lacking their own implementing structures. By means of 
the constitutional doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, EU policies penetrate well 
established domestic institutional and administrative arrangements, notions of appropriate 
action as well as structures and patterns of societal involvement in the policy process. EU 
environmental policies, in particular, often prescribe detailed administrative arrangements 
for their implementation monitoring and enforcement. Such arrangements have 
significant repercussions for pre-existing domestic institutional and administrative 
structures and patterns of policy making. The “goodness of fit” between EU requirements 
for effective implementation of environmental policies with pre-existing domestic 
structures and patterns of policy making is a crucial precondition that shapes domestic 
preferences regarding compliance (Duina, 1997; Knill, 1998; Börzel, 2000; 2003a; 
Cowles et al. 2001).  
Adjustment costs imposed by EU policies shape the incentives of domestic actors 
to undermine effective domestic implementation of EU policies. Voluntary non-
compliance largely depends on such cost/benefit considerations of domestic actors 
(Börzel, 2003b). The fundamental remedy for compliance problems offered by rational 
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choice approaches is that international organizations can strengthen the potential of a 
number of counter-factors that increase domestic actors’ incentives to comply with their 
legal obligations and/or raise the costs or compensate the benefits of non-compliance. 
There is a variety of such counter-factors. International organizations can raise the costs 
of non-compliance by establishing effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
International financial aid also plays a crucial role especially when it explicitly targets 
policy areas characterised by high costs of legal harmonization. 
The EU uses both enforcement and compensatory mechanisms (Tallberg, 2002). 
Compared to conventional international organizations, the former has much more 
effective enforcement mechanisms at its disposal. The Commission, as guardian of the 
EC Treaty under article 211, has the right to initiate legal action against member states 
for non-compliance with EU law. Infringement proceedings can lead to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the imposition of penalties in cases of persistent non-
compliance with EU laws (Article 226 TEU) or prior negative ECJ decisions (Article 228 
TEU – post litigation non-compliance). However, the Commission’s capacity to 
effectively monitor the compliance performance of each member state is largely 
constrained by the lack of its own monitoring mechanisms. Börzel (2001), in one of her 
first systematic accounts of infringement proceedings opened by the European 
Commission against member states, argues that given the reliance of the European 
Commission on decentralized monitoring and enforcement, infringement proceedings 
cover only cases which have been detected by the latter. Such deficiencies provide ample 
space for undetected non-compliance that, in effect, increases informal elements of 
flexible application of EU legal harmonization requirements. 
The Commission’s Directorate General for Environmental Policy (DG-ENVI) has 
rather weak monitoring and enforcement capacities compared to other Directorates 
General, such as Competition Policy (Macrory 1996).4 The Commission’s access to 
information regarding member states’ compliance performance depends on a rather weak 
system that involves three main alerting mechanisms: complaints by citizens, business 
                                                 
4 The European Commission recently announced that it will examine the possibility of establishing 
networks of national watchdogs to improve information flows on compliance performance, especially in 
internal market legislation (Financial Times, April 23, 2003, p. 1). 
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and environmental organizations; the Commission’s own initiatives; petitions and 
questions by the European Parliament. Complaints and petitions to the European 
Parliament are the most important source of information regarding the actual status of a 
member state’s compliance with EU laws. Non-state actors’ activism in using these 
opportunity structures can have catalytic effects on domestic compliance capacities, since 
it alters the distribution of costs and benefits increasing domestic actors’ willingness to 
comply (Koutalakis, forthcoming). Non-state actors’ activism is also a crucial factor that 
affects cost/benefit considerations of domestic actors regarding compliance with EU law 
by increasing the costs of non-compliance by mobilising domestic support for policy 
change (Börzel, 2003a). This can be achieved not only through the use of pressure 
activities such as media campaigns, protests and lobbying but also through the use of 
domestic institutional avenues such as litigation, procedural complaints, referenda, 
petitions and legislative initiatives. 
Rational choice approaches challenge conventional claims often found in the 
literature that attributes the poor performance of southern member states to endemic 
characteristics of their political cultures and institutional and administrative systems. 
Non-compliance in these member states is not a cultural phenomenon but a rational 
choice of political actors depending on their cost/benefit considerations regarding the 
application of EU laws to their domestic regulatory regimes. However, rational choice 
approaches fail to conceptualise and explain cases where member states are willing to 
comply but lack the necessary administrative resources to effectively undertake the 
complex tasks provided by EU laws. This is particularly the case with southern and 
central eastern European member states that, prior to their EU accession, had weak 
environmental regulatory regimes compared to those of their north western European 
counterparts. Although the former often realise that EU policies provide an indispensable 
frame of reference for the modernization of their domestic regulatory regimes, they suffer 
from limited economic resources, personnel and expertise to effectively monitor and 
enforce environmental regulations. In these cases of involuntary non-compliance, strict 
enforcement strategies with the imposition of penalties on member states that fail to 
comply with EU rules are counter-productive (Börzel, 2003b). The latter not only fail to 
solve compliance disputes arising from the lack of domestic administrative capacities to 
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effectively undertake monitoring and enforcement, but also de-legitimize the potential 
benefits of modernizing national institutions by transmitting authoritative top-down 
signals of the nature of EU integration process and foster an attitude of disregard for the 
law rather than providing incentives for institutional adaptation (Zylicz and Holzinger, 
2000: 222). Constructivist approaches offer an alternative logic of influencing member 
states’ non-compliant behaviour in cases when the latter are striving with a lack of 
administrative capacities. This effort involves management of the relevant disputes, 
transfer of experience, capacity building with funding programs and dissemination of 
lessons from best practices. International organizations play a central role in this process 
since they provide the institutional framework for facilitating such interactions between 
member states that lead to a socialisation of national actors with legal obligations, 
internalisation of their underlining logic and, in effect, a  redefinition of their preferences 
and interests in favour of compliance. In comparison to conventional international 
organizations, the EU offers a wide range of formal and informal institutional 
frameworks for socialization between national actors both at the stage of policy 
formulation and implementation through numerous committees of experts. Moreover, it is 
much more actively committed to building up domestic institutional capacities using 
structural funds that explicitly target environmental policy objectives. 
 The infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission against 
member states have been studied as a favourable institutional framework for testing the 
fundamental claims of the two theoretical perspectives briefly presented above. The bulk 
of these studies adopt a comparative qualitative case study methodological approach that 
offers significant insight into the difficulties experienced by different member states in 
implementing different EU directives (Börzel, 2003; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Haverland, 1999). A second strand in the literature employs comparative quantitative 
analyses in order to identify the domestic institutional factors that enable or impede 
effective adaptation of domestic regulatory regimes to EU legal provisions (Mbaye 2001; 
Laminen and Uusikylä 1998; Guiliani 2003; Sverdrup 2004). These studies offer an 
abundance of explanatory factors that influence domestic compliance performance in 
different political and administrative settings. However, their cumulative impact does not 
yet account for reliable conclusions regarding the fundamental characteristics of the EU 
 10
system of legal monitoring and enforcement, the corresponding strategies followed by the 
European Commission in dealing with non-compliant member states and their effects on 
legal (environmental) harmonization across the EU.  
 The study seeks to contribute to existing literature by elaborating on a quantitative 
approach that seeks to assess the fundamental characteristics of legal enforcement in the 
EU. What is the degree of rigidity of the current system of EU legal enforcement? 
Conversely, is the system flexible enough to respond to the challenges emanating from 
the inclusion of eight new member states with limited capacities to embark upon effective 
environmental harmonization? In order to do so, I focus on the experience of the southern 
enlargement that included member states with, at the time of their accession, equally 
weak institutional and administrative capacities to embark upon effective harmonization 
of their domestic environmental regulatory regimes to EU legislation. How has the 
Commission responded to a relevant challenge it the past? Drawing on the theoretical 
perspectives presented above we elaborate on two main hypotheses that we seek to test 
against data related to all infringement cases opened by the European Commission 
against member states during the period 1978-1999. 
 
Hypothesis A 
Drawing from rational choice theoretical perspectives that emphasise enforcement we 
hypothesise that the European Commission, when dealing with southern member states, 
seeks to raise their costs of non-compliance by increasing the level of rigidity in the 
enforcement proceedings. Detected infringement cases are more aggressively pursued 
and prosecuted to the ECJ. In this case the EU system of legal enforcement is applied in a 
legalistic way that disregards national institutional specificities that render effective 
harmonization unattainable.  
 
Hypothesis B 
Given the realisation on the part of the European Commission that southern member 
states face considerable problems in adjusting to the underlying logic and the precise 
policy requirements emanating from EU environmental legislative acts due to the lack of 
domestic administrative capacities, it adopts a loose stance in its dealings with those 
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member states. It pursues the detected cases less aggressively via the ECJ thus giving 
considerable time for domestic compliance actors to benefit from management 
mechanisms that facilitate policy transfer, capacity building with funding and transfer of 
experience and expertise. In this case the EU system of legal enforcement demonstrates a 
considerable degree of flexibility towards diverse domestic institutional conditions that 
render high pace harmonization unattainable. 
 
Flexible Harmonization? A Temporal Perspective 
 
This paper tests these hypotheses by means of quantitative analysis of all 
environmental infringement cases initiated by the Commission against member states 
during the period 1981-1999.5 This strategy disregards normative assessments concerning 
the optimal degree of flexibility in the EU policy making process according to ecological, 
economic and democratic criteria (Holzinger, 2000). Moreover, it does not account for 
the problem of undetected non-compliance that introduces an interesting, informal, yet 
extremely difficult to determine, potential of national deviations from harmonisation 
requirements (Börzel, 2001). In turn, it seeks to account for the application of the existing 
system of legal enforcement by the European Commission. It focuses on the temporal 
dimension of infringement proceedings opened by the European Commission against 
member states under Article 226 of the Treaty. These include the following steps: 
Following the Commission’s own investigations, complaints, petitions or questions by 
the European Parliament, the former sends a Formal Letter of Notice to the member 
states bringing to their attention a suspected case of violation of EU law. After an 
unsatisfactory reply by the member state, the Commission officially opens an 
infringement case by sending a Reasoned Opinion that establishes the legal basis and 
reviews evidence of violation found against the member state. Reasoned opinions often 
provide specific deadlines to member states in order to fulfil their legal obligations and 
fully comply with the law. In cases that member states fail to undertake all necessary 
legal actions in order to comply, the European Commission presents the case to the ECJ.  
                                                 
5 The author wishes to thank Tanja Börzel for providing access to a dataset of infringement cases opened by 
the European Commission during the period 1974-2000.  
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One of the first studies that seeks to quantitatively assess the nature of the 
European Commission’s legal enforcement strategies Tallberg (1999; 2002) demonstrates 
that both formal enforcement mechanisms and managerial strategies are used by the latter 
in a complementary way. Quantitative data demonstrates that a significant percentage of 
infringement cases opened by the Commission against member states are resolved at the 
pre-litigation stage in the framework of management strategies employed by the 
European Commission in its interaction with national compliance actors (Tallberg 2002: 
618). This is the outcome of a combined use by the European Commission of managerial 
conflict resolution mechanisms that seek to confront problems of lack of expertise, 
ambiguity of legal provisions and lack of resources under the ‘shadow of sanction’ such 
as the threat of economic penalties and ‘name-and-shame’ strategies (Snyder 1993; 
Börzel 2003a). The predominance of informal negotiating modes of conflict resolution 
between the European Commission and the member states reflects the reluctance on the 
part of the latter to grant strong enforcement powers to EU institutions. Only in the mid 
1990s did such a hesitant approach to enforcement significantly change. The realisation 
of the internal market programme elevated legal harmonization as a fundamental 
imperative. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) provided for a reinforced enforcement strategy 
and the possibility of imposing penalties for member states failing to comply with ECJ 
decisions (Art. 228 TEU). Economic sanctions are indeed an effective deterrent 
mechanism that increases the costs of non-compliance by member states leading to a 
considerable reduction in the number of infringement cases before their referral to the 
ECJ (Tallberg, 619). 
 Analysing the temporal dimension of infringement proceedings provides an 
indication of the strategies employed by the Commission in dealing with different 
member states. Such a dimension has attracted only limited attention of scholars of EU 
(environmental) harmonization. The bulk of studies that explicitly emphasise such a 
perspective focus on temporary derogations granted to certain member states during their 
pre-accession negotiations or during the process of the adoption of certain legislative 
acts. Such temporary derogations provide a period of flexible adjustment for member 
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states facing considerable problems in incorporating legal obligations into their domestic 
regulatory regimes.6  
In order to assess whether the Commission adopts a differentiated/flexible 
strategy in enforcing EU law in southern, ‘laggard’ member states compared to their 
northern, ‘leader’ EU counterparts, I embark upon cross country comparisons. I test the 
two hypotheses by accounting for two indicators:  
a) the average time from suspected to established infringements, namely the length of 
time from the point that the European Commission has notified a member state for a 
potential (suspected) case of violation of EU law by sending a Formal Letter of Notice 
until the time that it establishes an infringement case by sending a Reasoned Opinion. 
This indicator reveals the flexible or rigid dimension of enforcement proceedings. The 
longer it takes the Commission to establish an infringement proceeding the more flexible 
the application of enforcement mechanisms since member states are allowed more time to 
adjust to the requirements for effective implementation of EU laws.  
b) the average length of infringement proceedings, namely the length of time from the 
point that the Commission has established an infringement proceeding by sending a 
Reasoned Opinion until the time that the case is terminated either at the pre-litigation 
stage or by an ECJ judgement. The longer it takes the Commission to resolve an 
infringement case either by referring the case to the ECJ or by actively pursuing pre-
litigation agreements the more flexible the application of enforcement mechanisms 
provided by Art. 226 TEU. In these cases member states are granted long periods of 
‘grace’ in order to adjust to the requirements for the effective implementation of EU legal 
provisions.  
Our data refers to 951 infringement cases opened by the European Commission 
against member states for violating environmental law during the period 1981-1999. 
                                                 
6 While in previous accession negotiations the adoption of the acquis was just a condition of accession, in 
the current enlargement the implementation of the acquis by the prospective member states was a matter to 
be verified before accession. In its reinforced pre-accession strategy, the European Commission conducted 
assessments of the negotiation position prepared by candidate countries on each of the thirty one 
negotiation chapters which consist of the legal instruments for approximation (CEC, 1997). CEECs were 
granted only limited derogations in the area of environmental law 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/negotiations_report_to_ep.pdf). For a comparison 
between eastern and southern enlargements see Koutalakis, 2003). 
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Cross-country comparisons regarding the average time from suspected to established 
infringements reveal wide variations in the way the Commission pursues infringement 
cases against different member states.  
 
Figure 1. Average Time from Suspected to Established Infringements - EU 15 - ENVI
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Source: Own elaboration based on data publicly available at the EUI Database on Member State 
Compliance with EU law (www.iue.it/RSCAS/Reasearch/Tools/ComplianceDB/index.stml)
 
However, such variations do not reveal a differentiated approach of the Commission in 
dealing with southern member states nor do they reflect the leaders/laggards dichotomy 
often found in the literature. The average time it takes the Commission to initiate 
infringement proceedings is 1.8 years. Figure I reveals that the Commission pursues 
infringement cases more aggressively in southern member states than in their northern 
EU counterparts. Of the southern member states only Portugal, with a measure of 2 years, 
scores above the average accompanied by France with 2.3, and a group of countries 
belonging to the ‘leaders’ group comprised by the Netherlands with 2.2, Germany with 
2.1 and the UK with 2 years. Greece, Spain and Italy with 1.7, 1.6 and 1.5 years 
respectively accompanied by Belgium with 1.7, Ireland with 1.6 and a group of countries 
belonging to the ‘leaders’ group such as Luxemburg with 1.5, Denmark and Finland with 
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1.4 and Austria with 1.3 years, comprise the group of member states against which the 
Commission pursues infringement cases more aggressively.7  
A slightly differentiated outcome appears when accounting for the second indicator, 
namely the average length of infringement proceedings. 
Figure II. Average Length of Infringement Proceedings (1978-2000) - Environment -
EU 15 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data publicly available at the EUI Database on Member State Compliance 
with EU law (www.iue.it/RSCAS/Reasearch/Tools/ComplianceDB/index.stml)
 
The average length of infringement proceedings is 3.3 years. Italy with 3.7, Spain with 
3.5 and Portugal with 3.4 score just above the average. Among the member states with 
the longer average length of infringement proceedings are Germany with 4.2, Belgium 
with 4.1, France with 4 and the Netherlands with 3.9 years, which comprises the group of 
countries that benefit the most from long periods of ‘grace’ regarding the termination of 
cases.  From the ‘laggards’ group only Greece with 2.7 years scores much below the 
average accompanied by member states belonging to the ‘leaders’ group such as the UK 
with 3.3, Austria with 3, Sweden with 2.8, Ireland with 2.7, Denmark with 2.1 
Luxembourg with 2 and Finland with 1.9 years.  
                                                 
7 By no means does this imply that the Commission systematically favours certain member states over 
others. There is no evidence to suggest such a finding. The distribution of member states in Figure I, does 
not allow such inferences. In both groups can be found wealth and poor member states, high and low 
populated member states with high and low voting power in the European Council respectively as well as 
net contributors to EU budget and net receivers. 
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Both figures do not reveal a differentiated approach on the part of the Commission to the 
emergence of leader/laggards dynamics in the application of EU environmental law based 
on general territorial criteria. However, analysing the same indicators on a case-to-case 
basis reveals that such a flexible enforcement strategy is followed by the European 
Commission not along general territorial but rather functional criteria by allowing 
considerable delays in the application of Art 226 TEU provisions in cases where member 
states face considerable problems in adjusting to the precise requirements of certain 
legislative acts. The following figures III and IV analyse the temporal dimension of each 
of the 951 environmental infringement cases opened by the Commission against member 
states during the period 1981-1999.  
Figure III. Average time from Suspected to Established Infringements - Individual Cases - EU 15 - 
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Our analysis reveals that, out of the 951 suspected infringements, the vast majority of 
suspected violations (778) are pursued by the Commission to subsequent stages by 
sending a Reasoned Opinion within 1 or 2 years time (average 1.8 years). The rest of the 
cases comprise three main groups. In 8.4% of the cases (80) it takes the Commission 
three years from the time it suspects a violation of EU laws to actually initiate formal 
infringement proceedings against member states; 3.7% of the cases (36) are initiated in 4 
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years time and 3.3% of the cases (32) in 5 years. Beyond these three groups there are 
number of outstanding cases scattered well above the average with delays ranging from 6 
to 9 years. 
Long delays in the infringement proceedings provide considerable time for the 
member states to embark upon necessary institutional and administrative adjustments in 
order to comply with EU law. Accounting for the length of infringement proceedings in 
individual cases allows a more accurate view of functional differentiation as the outcome 
of the Commission’s strategy in dealing with infringement cases in different member 
states. 
 
Figure IV. Time for Terminating Individual Cases - EU 15 - ENVI
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Figure IV refers to 792 infringement cases that were terminated by the European 
Commission at the pre-litigation stage or after a relevant decision of the ECJ. 72.3% of 
these cases (573) are terminated in a period below or closely above the average of 3.6 
years. The rest of the cases are scattered across three main groups. 13.2% of the cases 
(105) are terminated within 5 to 6 years while 7.07% of the cases (56) in 7 to 8 years. 
Finally, a less homogenous group is comprised of 7.3% of outstanding cases (58) that are 
terminated in long periods of time that span from 9 to 15 years.  
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Concluding Remarks: Do we really need more flexibility? 
 
 As in the case of the southern enlargement, the expansion of the EU in central 
eastern Europe was mainly dictated by macro-political considerations. EU membership 
accentuated CEECs’ efforts to consolidate newly established democratic institutions, 
attain economic progress, escape isolationism and regain international respectability after 
the collapse of authoritarian regimes. As in the case of southern member states, CEECs 
European aspirations reflect cognitive, political and legal elements essential for their 
transitional phase. Their ‘return to Europe’ provides an indispensable frame of reference 
and source of cognitive ideas which helped newcomers to define their position and rights. 
EU membership endows their political ambitions with the necessary concepts, ideas, and 
functions as a frame of reference and basis for evaluating the domestic state of affairs in 
their path to social, political and economic modernization.  
The prevalence of macro-political considerations introduces considerable risks for 
the effective internalization of EU laws in a number of policy areas. Environmental 
policy is among the policy areas invoking high costs of institutional and administrative 
adjustment. Macro-economic limitations, political, institutional and administrative 
weaknesses are at odds with imperatives of effective environmental harmonization in the 
CEECs. In its reinforced pre-accession strategy, the Commission has attempted for the 
first time to minimize potential risks by combining several soft instruments aiming at 
building up domestic administrative capacities, such as the twinning programmes, with a 
strict application of conditionality criteria. However, excessive costs of environmental 
harmonization coupled with limited EU financial resources evoke considerable 
reservations regarding the CEECs’ actual pace of becoming integrated in the EU 
environmental regime.  
Given the weak institutional, administrative, and economic capacities of new 
member states to embark upon fast pace environmental harmonization and the 
increasingly diverse ecological, political, economic and demographic characteristics of 
the EU, the introduction of formal institutional arrangements that allow flexible 
deviations from a uniform application of EU laws emerges as an attractive alternative. 
However, such a perspective yields more dangers than opportunities for both ‘leader’ and 
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‘laggard’ member states in terms of environmental policy. Differential environmental 
regimes allowing diverse product standards across the EU would create considerable 
barriers to trade for the CEECs. Diverse environmental regimes offer an alternative to the 
top-down imposition of high environmental standards that would otherwise not be 
pursued in some member states. In effect they are more concurrent with democratic 
subsidiarity normative criteria at least as long as they do not interfere with trans-
boundary environmental damages. However, such a ‘multiple speed’ or ‘variable 
geometry’ Europe would significantly reduce the current potential of EU policies to 
penetrate domestic institutional traditions and serve as a driving force of institutional 
modernization as well as a stimulus of real convergence in living conditions for the less 
environmentally advanced member states.  
This paper challenges views calling for grand institutional reforms in order to 
formalise flexible environmental regimes in the EU. It proposes a number of quantitative 
indicators in order to assess the nature of the current system of EU legal monitoring and 
enforcement. My analysis reveals that the application of Art 226 TEU monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms by the European Commission allows considerable informal 
temporal deviations from harmonization requirements in the area of environmental law. 
However, such a flexible approach does not systematically favour member states 
characterised by weak administrative capacities such as the group of environmental 
southern ‘laggards’. Rather than basing decisions on general territorial criteria, the 
Commission appears to adopt a functional case-to case logic in granting long informal 
periods of grace to non-compliant member states. Analysing the temporal dimension of 
infringement proceedings opened by the Commission against member states offers a 
promising perspective for combining quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to 
assess the effects of such informal flexible arrangements on effective environmental 
harmonization across the EU. To what extent does such a perspective offer a viable 
institutional alternative to politically sensitive and controversial institutional reforms that 
dismiss harmonization as a core imperative of European integration by allowing flexible 
deviations from the environmental acquis communitaire? 
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